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MOVEABLES OF AMERICANS
THE LAW RULING THE MOVEABLES OF AMER-
ICANS MARRIED IN FRANCE OR IN BELGIUM
WITHOUT ANY SETTLEMENT OR
MARRIAGE CONTRACT
Which law governs the moveables of an American married in
France or in Belgium," without making a marriage contract or
any settlement whatever? The question at issue becomes of great
importance, whenever an American lady marries a Frenchman or
a Belgian.
I. According to American and English jurisprudence, the
law of the domicil of the husband at the time of the marriage
(or the intended domicil) determines the mutual rights of hus-
band and wife to each other's moveables, whether possessed at
the time of the marriage or acquired afterwards, without refer-
ence to the law where the marriage has been celebrated, or to
the law of the country where the marriage is celebrated, or where
the wife is domiciled before marriage.
2
II. By section 14oo of the Code Civil-which is the statute
law of Belgium (and was the law of the Rhine provinces in Ger-
many, but no longer since 19oo), there begins from the time of
the marriage, between husband and wife, married without a
marriage contract, a Communio bonorum, ruled by sections 14Ol
to 1496 inclusive, of the said Code Civil.
By section 14Ol, it is expressly stipulated that all moveables,
any interest of invested capital, bonds or shares whatever, all
rents, income and returns of real estate, even any real estate what-
ever acquired during coverture by husband or wife, shall fall into
the said community of goods (communautW de biens).
By section 1421, the husband is the only manager and owner
of such property.
Therefore, he alone has a right to dispose of it at will, and even
without the consent of his wife.
By section 1428, the separate property of the wife is even sub-
ject to the power and right of administration of the husband; he
1 The same law, the Code Civil, is the statute law of each country,
with some slight amendments.
2 A. V. Dicey, et E. Stocquart, Le Statut Personnel Anglais, t. II.
p. 200.
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can sue in her own rights and on her behalf, but he cannot dispose
of her real estate without his wife's consent.
III. According to the rules of private international law, as
administered by French and Belgian Courts, where there is no
marriage contract, or settlement, the mutual rights of Americans
(husband and wife) married in France or in Belgium, to each
others moveables, whether possessed at the time of the marriage
or acquired afterwards, are determined by the law of the hus-
band's actual domicil at the time of the marriage or the intended
domicil, usually called matrimonial domicil. This means the hus-
band's domicil is to prevail, when both parties have not the same
one.
IV. The place where marriage is celebrated is of no moment
in itself, whenevei it appears from circumstances, parties intend
to establish their home somewhere else. It might, under certain
circumstances (whenever there exists some doubt about the
actual or intended domicil),;be important in order to find out or
prove said domicil or intention.
A, an American citizen, domiciled in New York, marries in
Paris, B, a French woman, domiciled in France, with the inten-
tion to go and live in New York. The rights of the parties to
moveables are governed by the law of the State of New York.
A, an American citizen, domiciled in New York, marries in
London, B, a French woman, domiciled in France, with the in-
tention to go and live in New York. The rights of the parties
to moveables are governed by the law of the State of New York.
A, an American citizen, formerly domiciled in New York, mar-
ries in Paris, B, a French woman, with the intention to go and
live in London, where they establish their home. The rights of
the parties to moveables are governed by the law of England.
V. The actual domicil is of great importance, usually it is
conclusive proof for the clear intention of both parties regarding
the law which should rule their mutual rights to moveables. How-
ever, when indisputable facts show a decided intention to make
choice of a matrimonial domicil in another country than the hus-
band's actual domicil, such importance ceases to be conclusive and
gives way to the intended domicil.
This prevailing view, the doctrine of tacit contract to regulate
the rights of husband and wife to their moveables, either pos-
sessed at the time of marriage or acquired afterwards, in cases
where there is no express contract, is a principle laid down by
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ancient French jurists, namely by Charles Dumoulin. It seemed
to be and was held as a well-established principle in French juris-
prudence, a principle to last forever.
But, as Emerson writes, there is, no outside, no wall, no circum-
ference to us. Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new
series (On circles). This applies to legislation and jurisprudence
as well as to any other branch of science or part of human activity
and labour.
To ascertain parties' intentions, such as they existed in a long
past time, proved, in many cases tried by French and Belgian
Courts, to be a matter of the highest difficulty.
VI. In x883, in the Revue Critique de Ligislation et de Juris-
prudence, Professor Louis Renault began to object strongly to
the old doctrine of Dumoulin; he advocated a total change in
French jurisprudence: "Je suis dispos6 i penser qu'il faut re-
jeter ici l'idge de convention tacite; cette ide est le plus souvent
fausse; elle est un non sens dans le cas d'un contrat annul"
"Voici comment j'expliquerais les dispositions l6gales en cette
mati6re: la loi qui organise la famille et r~git les rapports per-
sonnels de ses membres r~gle aussi les rapports p6cunaires; ce
r6glement n'est pas imp~ratif, en ce sens que les parties peuvent
lui en substituer un autre, mais il s'impose toutes les fois qu'elles
n'ont pas exprim6 r6guli~rement une intention contraire. Ma
conclusion serait donc que la loi nationale du mari, qui r~git les
rapports des 6poux, d~termine en m~me temps le r~gime sons
lequel ius sont marius, en l'absence de stipulations formelles." 3
According to some lawyers and jurists, the view of tacit con-
tract is not in conformity with facts; few married people ever
think of it; according to M. Renault, as quoted hereabove, it is
sometimes nonsense.
VII. A clear, definite test, easily applied, might become a
sounder criterion of civil rights than past intention or domicil;
they advocated the principle of nationality applicable as a law
ruling moveables just as it is governing status and capacity. Now
some explanation on the rise and growth of the principle of alle-
giance or nationality, may be of some interest, and this will lead
to understand how the new doctrine was at once favored by many
jurists and some judges.
VIII. In the majority of European countries, allegiance or
332 (nouvelle srie 12) Revue Critique de Ligislation et de Juris-
prudence (1883). p. 73o.
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political nationality is the proper test of civil rights. The Courts
of such countries, and notably of France and Belgium, in com-
mon with the modern school of writers, of whom Baron von Bar,
Pasquale Fiore, Francois Laurent, Louis Renault, Andr6 Weiss
are the representatives, have adopted the doctrine that a person's
civil rights are in the cases to which English and American Courts
apply the law of his domicil, to be determined, not by such law,
but by the law of the country or State to which he belongs by
allegiance or citizenship.'
This view has been formally embodied-and for the first time,
in the Italian Code of 1865, which enacts:
Lo stato e la capacit delle persone ed i rapporti di farniglia
sono regolati dalla legge della nazione a cui esse appartengono;
"the status and the capacity of persons and family relations are
regulated by the law of the nation to which they belong."(Art. 6,
Codice Civile.)
The Spanish Code of 1889 has followed Italy: Las leyes
relativas a los derechos y deberes de familia o al estado, condicion
y capacidad legal de las personas obligan a los espanoles aunque
residan en pais extranjero; "the laws concerning the rights and
duties or the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding Spanairds even residing in a foreign country." (Art. 9,
Codigo Civil) .'
The German Code of igoo has substituted the same principle
for the law of domicil:6 "Die Geschiiftsfdhigkeit einer Person
qvird nach den Gesetzen des Staates beurteilt, dem die Person
angeh~rt; "the capacity of a person is determined by the laws of
the State to which the person belongs." (Art. 7, Einfihrungsegetz
-'um Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche.)
IX. The principle of nationality generally applies all over
Europe, when the United Kingdom stands alone and keeps to the
law of domicil.
Spain and Germany made it a rule governing moveables by
default of marriage contract. In France, the Court of Cassation
4 For further details, see 23 American Law Review (i889), 775.
5 For further details, see Manuel Torres Campos, Estudios de Derecho
International Privado, p. 26, Madrid (I891); especially on the laws of
marriage, E. Stocquart, Spanish Laws on Marriage and their Extraterri-
torial Effect, 25 American Law Review, (i89i) 82; Leon Medina e Manuel
Maran6n, Leyes Civiles de Espa~ia, p. 2 (9th Ed.).
6 See as to the former German view, E. Stocquart, Marriage in Private
International Law, 23 American Law Review (x889), 965.
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mentioned it for the first time, on the i8th of May, 1886, as a
ruling principle, in re J. Gabay v. Veuve Gabay.7 Since, several
decisions have declared nationality a definite test for the law
ruling moveables between parties married without a marriage
contract. The proposed convention of The Hague, i9o4, gives
up the law of domicil, clearly adopts the principle of nationality:
"Si les 6poux veulent faire un contrat, la capacit6 de chacun
d'eux i cet 6gard sera d6termin6 par sa loi nationale. au moment
de la c6l6bration. C'est la loi nationale qui dcide s'ils peuvent,
au cours du mariage, soit faire un contrat de mariage, soit modi-
fier leurs conventions matrimoniales, i condition de respecter les
droits des tiers."
This is what has been called by French jurists: "Le rigime
matrimonial incorpor6 dans le statut personnel."
In Belgium, no Courts have positively adopted the new doctrine
and the decisions on the present subject are even scarce, but
French Courts have, in several cases, decided in favor of the
national law of the husband, unless a contrary intention is clearly
shown by indisputable facts. This view is strongly advocated by
the learned and well-known professor of the University of Paris,
M. Andr6 Weiss (Traiti th~orique et pratique de droit inter-
national priv6, t. III, p. 554).
It may be the view to be generally taken by the Courts in the
next future; it is undoubtedly the direction given by this slow
but continuous and decided evolution of doctrine and juris-
prudence. Emil Stocquart.
7 Dalloz Piriodique, 1887, 1, 278.
